Hume’s critique of causation Essay Example for Free

Hume’s critique of causation Essay Our work aims to define David Hume’s views on causation. At first we should say that his critique of causation rose from the full theory of causal inference. In this way we may be better able to make out what is critical and what constructive in Humes views of causation and substance. It is sometimes said that Humes analysis of causation and substance is thoroughly dependent on his theory of ideas as to be quiet vitiated by the falsity of that theory. The constructive theory of causal inference, by which Hume connects his sceptical analysis of the causal relation with his final discovery of the impression of necessity in the felt determination of certain habits or customs in imagination, shows the limitations of such criticism as would dispose of Humes conception of experience as atomistic merely. It will be recalled that Hume begins the â€Å"Treatise of Human Nature† with an analysis of the perceptions of mind into impressions and ideas; and that, in the subsequent sections of Part I, he discloses the remaining elements of perception. Therefore, it would be incorrect to identify perception with any one of its elements, or with all of them taken respectively in isolation. Only mere fancies or perfect ideas occur divorced from all associations. Normally, in the experience of mature persons, there occurs, at the least, a lively idea associated with a present impression; which is, by definition, the general nature of belief. These beliefs vary in elaborateness and force between the extremes of proof and mere chance; but only at the extreme of mere chance, or gratuitous fancy, do isolated impressions or ideas exist. Ordinarily, the terms of Humes analysis of perception occur in the synthesis which he articulates in his theory of belief. Normal experience, then, will consist of perceptions, themselves the syntheses in habit which are beliefs. The substantial identity of things present here and now may be compared in direct perception. But only on the assumption that the causes of a things existence remain unaltered may the continued existence of a thing beyond perception be inferred. Again, although times and places as such admit of comparison without inference, still any constancy or variation in such relations may be inferred to exist only as a result of causation. That relation, therefore, is the principle of all inferences about matters of facts. Nothing exists which may not be considered as either a cause or an effect; though it is plain there is no one quality, which universally belongs to all beings, and gives them title to that denomination (Hume, 185). Since, therefore, the origin of the idea of cause and effect is to be found in no quality of our perceptions, it must be derived from some relation between them. Hume at once finds two such relations: causes and effects are contiguous in space and time, and the cause is always prior in time to the effect. Dr. Broad (120-2) points out that Humes proof of the temporal priority of causes is formally vicious. Hume himself seems to have had some doubts about its validity, for he writes: If this argument appear satisfactory, tis well. If not, I beg the reader to allow me the same liberty, which I have used in the preceding case, of supposing it such. For he shall find that the affair is of no great importance (225). But contiguity and succession do not afford a complete idea of causation. A thing at once contiguous and prior to another still might not be considered its cause. There is a necessary connection to be taken into consideration, and that relation is of much greater importance than any of the other two above mentioned (Hume 211). Necessary connection is then the defining characteristic of the causal relation. The impression from which this idea is derived is therefore the one we are looking for. Yet the only relations between impressions Hume has found so far are those of contiguity and succession, which I have already regarded as imperfect and unsatisfactory (216). And he proceeds to divide his problem into two questions: why we believe that every event must have some cause or other; and why we believe that the same cause must necessarily produce the same effect (Hume 223-6). Hume thus distinguishes the law of causality from the law of causation, and takes it that together they are what is meant by a necessary connection among events. Though a general maxim in philosophy, that every even must have a cause is not a matter of knowledge. This Hume demonstrates first on the grounds of his own view of the extent of knowledge. The law of causality may be identified neither with resemblance, degrees of quality, contrariety, nor proportions in quantity and number. The law is therefore not known to be true. Hume thinks that anyone who would controvert this conclusion will be obliged to exhibit a relation at once identical with causality and known by direct inspection, which it will then be time enough to examine (224). He proceeds next to urge that the law in question is to be demonstrated by apagogic reasoning on no theory of knowledge, and therefore is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain (228). That every event must have some cause or other means that the ideas of cause and effect are necessarily connected. Was this the case, it would be impossible that those ideas should be separable. Yet, since they are distinct, the ideas of cause and effect are separable; and the denial of their necessary connection involves no contradiction. Here Hume relies on the principle of his atomism. Yet he need not have done so; for the contradictory of the law of causality being not self-contradictory, that law is not demonstrable by apagogic reasoning. For since the relation of cause and effect is the principle of all inference about matters of fact, no inference to a probability can be independent of that relation. Hume takes his analysis thus far to have shown that our only notion of cause and effect is of certain objects constantly conjoined. We cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjunction. We only observe the thing itself, and always find that from the constant conjunction the objects acquire an union in the imagination (128). Our notion of cause and effect, as so far disclosed, is no more than a philosophical relation. Thus though causation be a philosophical relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet it is only so far as it is a natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it(Hume 131). And causation is more than a philosophical relation just so far as it is association. Concerning the nature of the transition from impression to idea in causal inference is thus that the transition is the work of associations or habits in imagination, not of reason. So understood, the inference from impression to idea Hume declares to be one part of the definition of an opinion or belief; that it is an idea related to or associated with a present impression (Hume 137). Hume insists that the idea of necessary connection derives from the felt force of the natural relation of cause and effect. The ideas of cause and effect being separable, there can be no contradiction in denying their necessary connection. Here again, however, Humes conclusion is valid independently of the assumption on which he himself makes it out. For the contradictory of the law in question is conceivable. And in going on to show the uniformity of nature to be indemonstrable, Hume points out on the one hand that we can at least conceive a change in the course of nature, which sufficiently proves that such a change is not absolutely impossible; and, on the other, that the uniformity in question being the presupposition of probable reasoning, any attempt at its demonstration by induction could only beg the question. Hume is giving a definition of cause and effect, so in conclusion he is describing the observed or felt nature of that relation. Those impressions may have causes Hume does not deny. He says the ultimate causes of sense-impressions are, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, (223) and he finds the alleged necessity that they have a cause to be not demonstrable. Nor are his arguments that impressions are prior to and productive of ideas advanced as a denial that impressions are thus productive. And the attraction of association is also assumed and its origins are regarded as inexplicable. Yet this means that impressions, ideas, and the attraction of association are found to exist in constant conjunction, not in necessary connection. That the than the logical necessity of Malebranche, means that what has been called a necessary connection is in fact habitual; not that from this conclusion we may infer the non-existence of causes. For the fact that the rational necessity of causation is not to be demonstrated plainly does not imply that nothing in the nature of a cause can exist. If we do not know the laws of causality and causation to be true, neither do we know them to be false. Hence there is no reason, the contradictory of which would be inconceivable, why causes should be or should not be assumed. The law of causation, being demonstrable by neither apagogic nor inductive reasoning, if demonstrable at all, will be on the ground that necessary connection in fact is disclosed within sense-perception. Since Humes failure to find that logical necessity obtains between the elements of sense-perceptions has been held to require his own analysis of experience, it may be well to consider briefly the fact that in other interests, and through a conception of experience not that of Hume, the same conclusion had been reached by three of the Cartesians. Hume may well emphasize the conclusion that all of our beliefs that are justified by experimental enquiry and all of our accurately successful causal inferences will depend upon the operation in the understanding of those fundamental habits by which cases of constant conjunction are disclosed and inferred. The nature of the understanding thus is what constitutes the foundations of induction. That the habits of which the understanding consists can in no case yield demonstrably certain conclusions, means that the foundations of induction are essentially illogical, to be neither demonstrated nor denied either by the reason of the Cartesians or by inductive theory itself. It is, finally, of the nature of the understanding that logic proper consists: the pretensions of our scholastic headpieces and logicians are simply to be set aside† (312). The assumption that the elements of experience are intrinsically self-identical is thus requisite to the view of impressions as complete in themselves. But the finding of elements by analysis is itself not the further explanation that these elements may be regarded as self contained because, like being simple, resemblance is not the name of a qualifying predicate. Whether or not the theory of philosophical relations be rejected along with the doctrine of impressions and ideas, the conclusion, as such, that apagogic reasoning is powerless in matters of existence, remains no less free of that theory and that doctrine, than is the conclusion itself of Humes failure to find necessary connections among matters of fact. For, as Professor Kemp Smith has pointed out, it was Hume who first perceived the falsity of the Cartesian, rationalistic view of the causal relation (537). Malebranche could discover no necessary connection between events, yet he continued to conceive of the causal relation as being intelligible to the pure understanding, and, as a consequence of his theory of knowledge as the vision in God, failed to draw the conclusion that the law of causation is neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain. For a real cause, Malebranche says, is a cause between which and its effect, the mind perceives a necessary connection (Rome 94). This conclusion drawn, Hume can attack the root of any assumption that the law of causation may be justified by experience. The attempted justification could only be inductive; and the law of causation is the presupposition of induction. Since causal inference is found to be neither rational nor merely sensory, if explicable at all, it will be so through an analysis, not of the fancies of the philosophers, but of the imagination that is the foundation of the senses and the memory. It is thus found that probable inference consists of the habits of imagination, or beliefs, which are the perceptions that constitute the mind, and of which the more firmly established in the imagination are the understanding. To conclude the work we should say that Humes chief innovation in association’s theory is his inclusion of cause and effect among the natural relations, or modes of association. Yet even a moderately detailed examination of Humes theories of causal inference and belief in substance may suffice to indicate how groundless is the charge of total scepticism, while at the same time it discloses the character of unanalysed experience in Humes view. The relation between his critical analysis of causation and that of the Cartesians, as well as the logical nature of Humes arguments in that regard, make it plain that his analysis here is independent of his chief psychological dogma. Works Cited Baillie, James. Hume on Morality. London: Routledge, 2000. Broad, Charlie Dunbar. Perception, Physics, and Reality; an Enquiry into the Information that Physical Science Can Supply About the Real. New York: Russell Russell, 1972. Hall, Roland. Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978. Hendel, Charles William Jr. Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York: Penguin Classics, 1986. Kemp Smith, Norman. A Commentary to Kants Critique of Pure Reason. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 Noonan, Harold W. Philosophy Guidebook to Hume on Knowledge. London: Routledge, 1999. Potkay, Adam. The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of Hume. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. Rome, Beatrice K. The Philosophy of Malebranche: A Study of His Integration of Faith, Reason, and Experimental Observation. Chicago: H. Regnery Co. , 1963. Stewart, John B. The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Strawson, Galen. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Stroud, Barry. Hume. London: Routledge, 1977.

Bacons Rebellion Essay -- American History Nathaniel Bacon Papers

Bacon's Rebellion Sometimes there comes an event in American History in which no one knows exactly why it happened. What the motives of the event were are left to the interpretation of the historian doing the research. Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676 was on such event. Wilcomb E. Washburn’s view is precise when he states, â€Å" Bacon’s Rebellion. . .was an event on which observers could agree on the facts, but divide on the interpretation.† Historians have been picking into peoples’ accounts and versions of the legend for over 3 centuries, but never coming to a common conclusion. One fact is for sure and that is that the rebellion, known as Bacon’s, was what was going to pave the way towards Revolution of British Authority. In this paper I will look at one aspect that I feel was the motivation behind one individual's defiance to authority and the need to take matters regarding Indian relations into his own hands. Bacon was the kind of person to take what he thought was right into his own hands, even if it meant that he was breaking the law. In his eyes he was doing right and if he did not have the official support, he was going to do it anyway. On the other side was the feeble and zealous Governor of Virginia, Sir William Berkeley. The Rebellion was also called, â€Å" the first protest against royal authority in America.† Sir William Berkeley was the second cousin of Bacon. Not wanting for the relations with the Indians to deteriorate, Berkeley did not thirst for an all out war in order to control the growing Indian crisis. He believed that the Indians should be punished for killing the settlers and wreaking havoc on their lives, however, not in the magnitude that Bacon had ... ...ution-an HTML Project. Accessed on 7 October 2000. Available at http://odur.let.rug.n1/~usa/D/1651-1700/bacon_rebel/berke.htm Mooy, Age. â€Å"Bacon’s Declaration in the Name of the People (30 July 1676)†, The American Revolution-an HTML Project. Accessed on 7 October 2000. Available at http://odur.let.rug.n1/~us/D/1651-1700/bacon_rebel/bacon.htm Washburn, Wilcomb E. The Governor and The Rebel: A History of Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia. North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1957. Webb, Stephen Saunders. 1676: The End of American Independence. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1984. Wertenbaker, Thomas Jefferson. Torchbearer of the Revolution: The Story of Bacon’s Rebellion and its Leader. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940. William & Mary College Historical Magazine. Vol. 9, Issue I. (July, 1900) Bacon's Rebellion Essay -- American History Nathaniel Bacon Papers Bacon's Rebellion Sometimes there comes an event in American History in which no one knows exactly why it happened. What the motives of the event were are left to the interpretation of the historian doing the research. Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676 was on such event. Wilcomb E. Washburn’s view is precise when he states, â€Å" Bacon’s Rebellion. . .was an event on which observers could agree on the facts, but divide on the interpretation.† Historians have been picking into peoples’ accounts and versions of the legend for over 3 centuries, but never coming to a common conclusion. One fact is for sure and that is that the rebellion, known as Bacon’s, was what was going to pave the way towards Revolution of British Authority. In this paper I will look at one aspect that I feel was the motivation behind one individual's defiance to authority and the need to take matters regarding Indian relations into his own hands. Bacon was the kind of person to take what he thought was right into his own hands, even if it meant that he was breaking the law. In his eyes he was doing right and if he did not have the official support, he was going to do it anyway. On the other side was the feeble and zealous Governor of Virginia, Sir William Berkeley. The Rebellion was also called, â€Å" the first protest against royal authority in America.† Sir William Berkeley was the second cousin of Bacon. Not wanting for the relations with the Indians to deteriorate, Berkeley did not thirst for an all out war in order to control the growing Indian crisis. He believed that the Indians should be punished for killing the settlers and wreaking havoc on their lives, however, not in the magnitude that Bacon had ... ...ution-an HTML Project. Accessed on 7 October 2000. Available at http://odur.let.rug.n1/~usa/D/1651-1700/bacon_rebel/berke.htm Mooy, Age. â€Å"Bacon’s Declaration in the Name of the People (30 July 1676)†, The American Revolution-an HTML Project. Accessed on 7 October 2000. Available at http://odur.let.rug.n1/~us/D/1651-1700/bacon_rebel/bacon.htm Washburn, Wilcomb E. The Governor and The Rebel: A History of Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia. North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1957. Webb, Stephen Saunders. 1676: The End of American Independence. New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1984. Wertenbaker, Thomas Jefferson. Torchbearer of the Revolution: The Story of Bacon’s Rebellion and its Leader. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940. William & Mary College Historical Magazine. Vol. 9, Issue I. (July, 1900)

Stated in the case

From the case, I could notice that divisions and therefore company itself is treating AM division almost as a separate business and the three divisions would like to make more profit while selling goods to AM division. Partly it is a exult of incentive system based only on ROI, and historic fact that in the past all these divisions were separate companies. I would recommend short term solution to make process of fixing the price for AM division simple. Solution could be that we use simple formula for internal AM division : cost price + minimum profit margin.Since, incentives are not affected directly by this formula, it should be very easy to use it and I can ‘ t see any valid reason why not to use it instead of current one which is spending directors and division managers time and effort to set the price for every case separately. Long term solution based on my experience is to integrate three divisions into AM division, but keeping all their major advantages as separate divis ions and also to incentive divisions as part of AM sale. Second concern is that three divisions are treating AM division as an unwanted brother.Since company has quite frigid incentive systems divisions don ‘t benefit while selling to AM division. In their ROI based incentive system it has much more sense to sell same products to MOM than to AM. By keeping this behavior in Abram organization, they are holding AM to grow bigger and show its full potential. By combining incentive with AM division results this problem would be solved. Third concern is excessive inventory throughout the year. Based on my experience would say that this problem has roots in quite complex and slow† organization/management.Three completely independent division are unnecessary and by having one one main planning for production (three division) and one planning for sales (AM division), Abram could implement a more leaner inventory planning since instead of having 4 separate planning, and with thre e of them for production, we will have two major planning. Side effect would be increasing negotiation power while purchasing goods and more efficient inventory level. 2nd Question: What is your overall evaluation of Abram s management control system? Describe and strengths or weaknesses that you identified, but did not include in answering previous question.What changes, if any, would you recommend to top management? Abram current measurement system is based on ROI. My opinion is that it sin ;t suitable for a company like Abram is. Any investment done in this year will affect your bonuses in the next, and actually this system denominates oh to improve your systems, equipment or educate staff. In the era of fast changing companies and Internet, it is extremely dangerous to have a system in a company that forces managers all the time to use maximum from the equipment and people without any upgrades.Sometimes, if a competition is strong, and it is stated in the case, that industry is very price sensitive, if you don ‘ t upgrade or invest you will lose you market share since somebody else will invest only because we gave them the space. Weaknesses of Abram company would be: Dangerous ROI measurement system Fragmented inefficient organization, with implementing leaner systems it can become much more cost efficient Strategy that stops divisions to reach its full potential.Examples, AM can ‘t sell products from other brands. Some brands are market leaders in the industry and Abram spare parts could be sold as a side part or compatible part or combo. Divisions are denominated to invest in the future and upgrades. Each division has it own sales director selling to MOM. By having sales centralized, by accomplishing one big MOM deal Abram could sell products from 2 or even three divisions, at the moment their maximum is to sell only product from their division.Planning is not centralized and therefore company is not using its full negotiating strength Streng ths of Abram company would be: They have incentive system which shows that they understand that one of the main drivers to success are employees engaged in companies goals They have clear management structure. It is quite inefficient but by having a structure it shows that they could change it and have more efficient firm structure again They have ongoing business and therefore good position to feel all positive changes they implement.

Facts About Eohippus

In paleontology, correctly naming a new genus of an extinct animal can often be a long, tortured affair. Eohippus, aka Hyracotherium, is a good case study: This prehistoric horse was first described by the famous 19th century paleontologist Richard Owen, who mistook it for an ancestor of the hyrax, a small hoofed mammal—hence the name he bestowed on it in 1876, Greek for hyrax-like mammal. A few decades later, another eminent paleontologist, Othniel C. Marsh, gave a similar skeleton discovered in North America the more memorable name Eohippus, or dawn horse. Since Hyracotherium and Eohippus were considered for a long time to be identical, the rules of paleontology dictated that this mammal be called by its original name, the one bestowed by Owen. Never mind that Eohippus was the name used in countless encyclopedias, childrens books, and TV shows. Now, the weight of opinion is that Hyracotherium and Eohippus were closely related, but they were not identical. The result is that its once again kosher to refer to the American specimen, at least, as Eohippus. Amusingly, the late evolutionary scientist Stephen Jay Gould railed against the depiction of Eohippus in the popular media as a fox-size mammal, when in fact it was the size of a deer. Ancestor of Modern Horses Theres a similar amount of confusion about whether Eohippus or Hyracotherium deserves to be called the first horse. When you go back in the fossil record 50 million or so years, it can be difficult, verging on impossible, to identify the ancestral forms of any given extant species. Today, most paleontologists classify Hyracotherium as a palaeothere, that is, a perissodactyl, or odd-toed ungulate, ancestral to horses and the giant plant-eating mammals known as brontotheres typified by Brontotherium, the thunder beast. Its close cousin Eohippus, on the other hand, seems to deserve a place more firmly in the equid than in the palaeothere family tree, though, of course, this is still up for debate. Whatever you choose to call it, Eohippus was clearly at least partly ancestral to all modern-day horses, as well as to the numerous species of prehistoric horse, such as Epihippus and Merychippus, that roamed the North American and Eurasian plains of the Tertiary and Quaternary periods. As with many such evolutionary precursors, Eohippus didnt look much like a horse, with its slender, deerlike, 50-pound body and three- and four-toed feet. Also, judging by the shape of its teeth, Eohippus munched on low-lying leaves rather than grass. In the early Eocene epoch, during which Eohippus lived, grasses had yet to spread across the North American plains, which spurred the evolution of grass-eating equids. Facts About Eohippus Eohippus, Greek for dawn horse, pronounced EE-oh-HIP-us; also known (possibly not correctly) as Hyracotherium, Greek for hyrax-like beast, pronounced HIGH-rack-oh-THEE-ree-um Habitat: Woodlands of North America and Western Europe Historical Epoch: Early-Middle Eocene (55 million to 45 million years ago) Size and Weight: About two feet high and 50 pounds Diet: Plants Distinguishing Characteristics: Small size; four-toed front and three-toed back feet